

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
NASHVILLE DIVISION**

**In re: RealPage, Inc., Rental Software
Antitrust Litigation (No. II)**

**Case No. 3:23-md-03071
MDL No. 3071**

Judge Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr.

**This Document Relates to:
All Cases**

**MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO STAY
ALL DISCOVERY PENDING RULING ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS**

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I. INTRODUCTION

Defendants seek a stay of discovery pending resolution of their Motions to Dismiss. Courts routinely stay discovery in antitrust cases like this to assess the viability of the claims before requiring parties to undertake the huge burden and expense of discovery. Even when such cases survive dismissal, narrowing the scope of antitrust claims and the defendants facing those claims can avoid extremely costly and burdensome discovery, particularly for the defendants that ultimately are dismissed. This litigation especially warrants a stay given the many significant deficiencies with Plaintiffs' claims, including naming Defendants that do not use RealPage's revenue management software. Plaintiffs' claims do not plausibly allege any anticompetitive agreement among Defendants (much less a price-fixing conspiracy) or any cognizable harm to competition in any purported relevant market. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss should obviate discovery altogether or significantly limit its scope and nature.¹

Plaintiffs allege a nationwide conspiracy to fix rental and vacancy rates since 2016 for multifamily housing. Plaintiffs seek to represent putative classes of potentially millions of tenants who rented from one of 48 Multifamily Lessor Defendants across the country, including in more than 50 "submarkets" around the country. Data discovery alone from dozens of Defendants will be a colossal undertaking given the extraordinary scope and volume of rental and vacancy rates at issue and the corresponding individual decisions of each Lessor Defendant regarding each of those rates. And discovery will require extensive examination of competitive

¹ Certain Defendants are filing motions to dismiss that challenge personal jurisdiction and other deficiencies in the Complaint. Those Defendants join this Motion without waiver of their motions to dismiss. This Motion is warranted as to those Defendants so that they do not expend significant resources on discovery for claims that lack merit or personal jurisdiction. In addition, Defendant Trammell Crow Company, LLC does not join this Motion for the reasons set forth in Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss. (Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 7 n.6.)

conditions in dozens of so-called “submarkets,” which do not even constitute proper antitrust relevant markets.

In short, opening discovery before the Court decides the Motions to Dismiss would waste judicial resources and impose a substantial burden on Defendants as well as nonparties, such as competing lessors that are not part of the alleged conspiracy. The Court should decide the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims before discovery begins. Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced by staying discovery while the Court decides the Motions to Dismiss and cannot demonstrate any reason for discovery to proceed now.

II. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

On October 15, 2022, ProPublica published an article concerning RealPage Inc.’s (“RealPage”) YieldStar software.² Focusing on the use of YieldStar *in Seattle*, the article simply considers whether the use of YieldStar might play a role in increasing rents. (*Id.*) The article emphasizes that “[w]hat role RealPage’s software has played in soaring rents—which in the decade before the pandemic nearly doubled in some cities—is hard to discern. Inadequate new construction and the tight market for homebuyers have exacerbated an existing housing shortage.” (*Id.*) On October 18, 2022—three days after the article’s publication—Plaintiff Sherry Bason and four other named plaintiffs sued RealPage and nine property management companies on behalf of a putative nationwide class in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California regarding the use of RealPage software to set rental rates. Compl., *Bason v. RealPage*, No. 3:22-cv-01611 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 2022), Dkt. 1. Following *Bason*, 37 additional putative class actions against RealPage and dozens of other Defendants were filed across the country.

² Heather Vogel, *Rent Going Up? One Company’s Algorithm Could Be Why.*, ProPublica (Oct. 15, 2022), <https://www.propublica.org/article/yieldstar-rent-increase-realpage-rent>.

On April 10, 2023, the U.S. Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred the actions to the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee and assigned them to Chief Judge Crenshaw. (Dkt. 1 at 2.) On July 5, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a First Amended Consolidated Multifamily Class Action Complaint naming RealPage and nearly 50 Lessor Defendants (Dkt. 314 ¶¶ 41-91), implicating dozens of distinct and very different commercial areas across the country (*id.* ¶¶ 245-393). Plaintiffs allege a relevant time period dating back to 2016 (*id.* ¶ 1) and a class period dating back to 2018 (*id.* ¶ 402). Plaintiffs also filed a Student Housing Class Action Complaint (Dkt. 290), which was voluntarily dismissed on July 3, 2023 (Dkt. 308).

Since initiating this litigation and filing the current Class Action Complaint—which Plaintiffs already have amended once—the parties involved in these actions have been in flux. Plaintiffs have dismissed 23 defendants and dropped 50 plaintiffs previously named in earlier complaints. Additionally, certain plaintiffs may be subject to arbitration agreements, class action waivers, and jury trial waivers as Defendants have previously noted. And it is now unclear whether there will be a student housing component to this litigation—and if so, when and what exactly that will entail. This Motion concerns discovery for only the Multifamily Complaint (Dkt. 314) as there is no other complaint currently before this Court. Concurrent with this Motion to Stay, Defendants are moving to dismiss the Multifamily Complaint.

The tremendous amount of variation among Defendants demonstrates the particular complexity, burden, and expense of discovery here. To start, Defendants differ in size and the number of tenants and customers they serve. For instance, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Greystar Management Services, LP manages over 698,000 units (*id.* ¶ 64) while Defendant B/T Washington, LLC manages only around 5,300 units (*id.* ¶ 86). Defendants also operate units in

different areas of the country, and Plaintiffs have not specified which Defendants allegedly conspired in which alleged “submarkets,” leaving Defendants to guess at the scope of the allegations against them. Some Defendants focus primarily on one locality or region, such as Defendant Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc., which operates in only certain markets in three states on the west coast (*id.* ¶ 76), while others operate more broadly. And Defendants have a variety of business models. Some, such as Defendant Avenue5 Residential, LLC, manage but do not own properties; others own and manage properties; and still others own but do not manage properties, instead relying on property managers that are not alleged to be part of the conspiracy pled here. As a result, some Defendants do not even decide rental or vacancy rates for the properties they own or manage, some do not decide whether or how to use revenue management software, and some do not have any direct interest in rental or vacancy rates. In fact, Defendants employ a variety of pricing strategies for their different properties. As explained on RealPage’s Frequently Asked Questions page, which Plaintiffs cite in their Complaint:

Each apartment provider has its own unique strategy for managing a particular property. Some providers may execute a strategy to quickly lease-up or minimize vacancies at a particular property, and thus configure their software to align with that strategy by establishing lower rents to quickly reach or consistently maintain very high or full occupancy. Others may tolerate more or longer vacancies in order to obtain higher rents and thus configure their software to support that strategy.³

Relatedly, Defendants vary in their use of RealPage’s revenue management software, including the type of revenue management software used and how they use it. RealPage offers three different revenue management products for multifamily housing: YieldStar, AI Revenue Management, and Lease Rent Options. (Dkt. 314 ¶¶ 2, 106.) Plaintiffs admit that Defendants

³ RealPage, Inc., *Frequently Asked Questions About Revenue Management Software*1 (Oct. 16, 2022), <https://www.realpage.com/storage/files/pages/faqs/pdfs/2022/10/revenue-management-faqs.pdf>.

use these products to very different degrees, conceding that some Defendants have “low acceptance rate[s] of RealPage’s pricing recommendations” (*id.* ¶ 170), and all Defendants reject RealPage pricing recommendations *at least 10-20% of the time*. (*Id.* ¶¶ 5, 129 (alleging Lessor Defendants adopt the software’s pricing recommendations “*up to 80%-90% of the time*” (emphasis added).) These and many other important aspects of how these diverse and differently-situated Defendants operate, including use of the RealPage software at issue, will be the subject of significant, costly discovery.

The Court’s decision on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss should significantly reduce the burden and expense by narrowing discovery or avoiding it altogether.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

“[T]here is no general right to discovery upon filing of the complaint,” as the “very purpose of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) ‘is to enable defendants to challenge the legal sufficiency of complaints without subjecting themselves to discovery.’” *Yuhasz v. Brush Wellman, Inc.*, 341 F.3d 559, 566 (6th Cir. 2003). “Trial courts have broad discretion and inherent power to stay discovery until preliminary questions that may dispose of the case are determined.” *Hahn v. Star Bank*, 190 F.3d 708, 719 (6th Cir. 1999). In exercising that discretion, courts “weigh the burden of proceeding with discovery upon the party from whom discovery is sought against the hardship which would be worked by a denial of discovery.” *Bolletino v. Cellular Sales of Knoxville, Inc.*, No. 3:12-CV-138, 2012 WL 3263941, at *1 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 9, 2012) (citation omitted); *see also* Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1) (“The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”). “At bottom, ‘a motion to stay discovery involves a pragmatic decision whether the possibility of saving the time and expense of discovery justifies a delay in proceedings.’” *Anderson v. Catalina Structured Funding, Inc.*, No. 1:21-CV-197, 2021 WL 9000112, at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 1, 2021)

(citation omitted).

A stay is especially warranted in an antitrust case like this. The Supreme Court and the Sixth Circuit have warned against imposing costly and burdensome discovery in complex antitrust cases before the court determines that the plaintiffs have plausibly alleged a conspiracy. *See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 558-59 (2007) (recognizing the “unusually high cost of discovery in antitrust cases”); *In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig.*, 583 F.3d 896, 908-09 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Pursuant to *Twombly*, district courts must assess the plausibility of an alleged illegal agreement *before* parties are forced to engaged in protracted litigation and bear excessive discovery costs.” (emphasis in original)). Thus, courts routinely stay discovery in antitrust actions like this to avoid imposing unnecessary time and expense on parties and non-parties while dispositive motions are pending. *See, e.g., Crowder v. LinkedIn Corp.*, No. 22-cv-00237-HSG, 2023 WL 2405335, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2023) (finding that “[i]t is sounder practice to determine whether there is any reasonable likelihood that plaintiffs can construct a claim before forcing the parties to undergo the expense of discovery”); *Cal. Crane School, Inc. v. Google LLC*, No. 21-cv-10001-HSG, 2022 WL 1271010, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2022) (granting stay of discovery in part because “forcing Defendants to spend time and resources on [discovery] . . . before the Court has an opportunity to assess whether Plaintiff has pled any plausible claims against them may subject Defendants to undue burden and expense”); *Cubicle Enters., LLC v. Rubik’s Brand Ltd*, No. 18-cv-963 (JPO), 2018 WL 11224256, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2018); *Bertsch v. Discover Fin. Servs.*, No. 2:18-cv-00290-GMN-GWF, 2018 WL 11442871, at *1 (D. Nev. June 12, 2018); *Integrated Sys. & Power, Inc. v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc.*, No. 09 CV 5874 (RPP), 2009 WL 2777076, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1, 2009).

IV. ARGUMENT

This litigation should be stayed for several reasons. *First*, resolving Defendants’ Motions

to Dismiss will determine the need for or extent of discovery, as well as the parties subject to discovery. *Second*, Defendants and nonparties will be prejudiced by beginning costly and burdensome discovery before that determination is made. The burden of discovery will be particularly acute here given the nature of Plaintiffs' expansive claims, the numerous alleged markets, the number of Defendants involved, and the lengthy time period. The Court also would be burdened by expending resources on discovery-related issues later mooted by a decision on Defendants' Motions to Dismiss. *Third*, Plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice from a stay of discovery while the Court reaches that decision.

A. Discovery Should Be Stayed Because Resolving Defendants' Motions Will Determine the Need For, or Extent of, Discovery

Discovery should be stayed unless the Court first rules that Plaintiffs have a viable claim, and if so, the scope of that claim and which Defendants remain in the litigation. *See, e.g., Anderson*, 2021 WL 9000112, at *2 (staying all discovery pending a decision on defendant's motion to dismiss); *Bolletino*, 2012 WL 3263941, at *1 (same); *Harmer v. Cannata*, No. 3:22-cv-00976, 2023 WL 2228985, at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Feb. 24, 2023) (staying discovery pending a motion to dismiss, in part, because the motion raised issues of whether some defendants were properly named, which would bear on the scope of discovery). The continued uncertainty around the parties in this litigation and whether (and if so, when) the student housing aspect of the litigation will be revived, which would impact the parties involved and the claims at issue, makes this a particularly pertinent point here. Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, if granted, would eliminate the need for discovery entirely. This is an especially compelling factor here given that many cases similarly premised on pricing "recommendations" or a "rimless hub-and-spoke conspiracy" have failed. *See, e.g., In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig.*, 618 F.3d 300, 329 (3d Cir. 2010) (allegations that insurance-broker "hub" shared competitive information with insurer

“spokes” did not permit inference of conspiracy absent allegations of “horizontal” sharing between insurers; affirming dismissal); *In re Travel Agent Comm’n Antitrust Litig.*, 2007 WL 3171675, at *11 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (“availability of Defendants’ commission rates” is not “evidence of a conspiracy”; dismissing complaint), *aff’d*, 583 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2009).

If the Court grants Defendants’ Motions in whole or in part, discovery will be significantly narrowed when compared to the current scope of the Complaint. For example, if discovery proceeds while the Motions are pending, because Plaintiffs’ current Complaint fails to specifically allege “who, did what, to whom (or with whom), where, and when,” Defendants may be unfairly subject to broad, burdensome discovery in geographic areas in which they are not alleged to have conspired or had any impact. *Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc.*, 518 F.3d 1042, 1048 (9th Cir. 2008).

Additionally, Plaintiffs are not permitted to engage in post-filing discovery to remedy deficiencies in their complaints. *See New Albany Tractor, Inc. v. Louisville Tractor, Inc.*, 650 F.3d 1046, 1051 (6th Cir. 2011). The Complaint is legally deficient for multiple, independent reasons, as explained in Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss. But Plaintiffs may not use discovery to try to cure those deficiencies.

Further, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss raise purely legal issues for the Court to decide without the need for discovery. The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[l]imitations on pretrial discovery are appropriate where claims may be dismissed ‘based on legal determinations that could not have been altered by any further discovery.’” *Gettings v. Bldg. Laborers Loc. 310 Fringe Benefits Fund*, 349 F.3d 300, 304 (6th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted); *Muzquiz v. W.A. Foote Mem’l Hosp., Inc.*, 70 F.3d 422, 430 (6th Cir. 1995) (limitations on pretrial discovery are appropriate where claims may be dismissed “based on legal determinations that could not have

been altered by any further discovery”). Because Plaintiffs’ allegations are taken as true under Rule 12(b)(6) (notwithstanding the demonstrable inaccuracy of many of the allegations), no discovery is required or appropriate at this stage. *See Gettings*, 349 F.3d at 304 (affirming a motion to stay, in part, because there were claims that could be decided as a matter of law).

B. Defendants and Nonparties Will Be Prejudiced by Costly, Burdensome Discovery Prior to the Court’s Resolution of the Motions to Dismiss

A discovery stay while the Court decides the Motions to Dismiss would prevent unnecessary waste of the parties’ and nonparties’ resources if the claims are dismissed or narrowed, as they should be. The Supreme Court has emphasized that “antitrust discovery can be expensive” and has cautioned courts that they “must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed.” *Twombly*, 550 U.S. 554 at 558 (When “the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief, ‘this basic deficiency should ... be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.’” (citation omitted)).

The scope of Plaintiffs’ antitrust claims and the facts necessary to rebut them emphasize the significant burden that discovery would impose. Plaintiffs assert claims of “massive collusion” (Dkt. 314 ¶ 16) allegedly involving “vast amounts of [] non-public proprietary data” (*id.* ¶ 5) against nearly 50 Lessor Defendants operating in dozens of so-called “submarkets” (*id.* ¶¶ 245-393). One group of Plaintiffs states that even before filing suit, they “hired consulting experts, purchased and analyzed data on multifamily rental housing, interviewed numerous confidential witnesses (including high-level industry insiders), and dedicated over 600 hours to investigating this case.” (Dkt. 258 at 1.) As detailed in Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, *none* of those witnesses or data indicate a *horizontal* agreement among any of the Defendants to fix prices, but nevertheless the effort Plaintiffs claim to have made just to file this litigation

highlights how burdensome and costly discovery will be if it survives dismissal.

The variation among Defendants further highlights this fact. For example, they vary widely in terms of the number and characteristics of units they manage, the tenants they serve, and their revenues, rental rates, and organization size; they operate units in different commercial areas of the country and do not all compete with one another; they price those units in different ways, to the extent they make pricing decisions, including the extent and nature of any use of revenue management software; and they utilize different revenue and inventory management tools from RealPage (where they use those tools at all). Understanding the many facts involved in each of these issues and how those facts changed over time will require very costly discovery. This includes burdensome discovery into the specific commercial dynamics of each alleged “submarket,” such as the impact of inflation, the global pandemic, the number of available housing units, and other circumstances affecting those dynamics. Significant discovery will be needed from nonparties competing with one or more Defendants in each of the “submarkets” and more broadly, such as regarding their respective market shares, property characteristics, rental and vacancy rates, revenue management software usage, and pricing and vacancy decisions. This nonparty discovery will be important for establishing that the alleged conspiracy could not have artificially increased rental rates because of fierce competition from countless other lessors in each purported “submarket” and across the country. A discovery stay would avoid this potentially unnecessary burden and cost on nonparties. *See Ema Fin., LLC v. Vystar Corp.*, 336 F.R.D. 75, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (granting stay of discovery, in part, because potential discovery would impose a significant burden on third parties).

Discovery also will be needed for each named Plaintiff and potentially many other tenants given that Plaintiffs allege injury for potentially millions of putative class members,

adding another layer of complexity to the discovery process. *See, e.g., Stone v. Vail Resorts Dev. Co.*, No. 09-cv-02081-WYD-KLM, 2010 WL 148278, at *2 (D. Colo. Jan. 7, 2010) (granting motion to stay discovery as to plaintiffs’ class action claims because, in part, “[d]iscovery as to those claims is likely to be significant” as they involve “up to sixty-six” putative class members). And discovery will be needed from the “confidential witnesses” who are allegedly former employees of a handful of Defendants and nonparties and upon whom Plaintiffs rely for their claims. (*See, e.g.,* Dkt. 314 ¶¶ 1, 7-9.)

Lastly, litigating discovery-related issues later mooted by a decision on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss would be an unnecessary waste of judicial resources. *See Robinson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.*, No. 5:19-cv-00049-TBR, 2019 WL 5566532, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 28, 2019) (Courts generally stay discovery pending resolution of the underlying claim when it would “prevent prejudice, eliminate potentially unnecessary litigation expenses, and promote the interest of judicial economy.”); *Prison Legal News v. Bezotte*, No. 11-cv-13460, 2012 WL 5417457, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 6, 2012) (noting that a stay of discovery until resolution of the pending motions would prevent wasting judicial resources); *Sobczak v. Corr. Med. Servs., Inc.*, No. 1:09-ccv-57, 2010 WL 597239, at * 1 (W.D. Mich. Feb. 17, 2010) (finding that “a stay of discovery pending the determination of a dispositive motion is an eminently logical means to prevent wasting the time and effort of all concerned, and to make the most efficient use of judicial resources” (citation omitted)). A stay properly preserves party and judicial resources.⁴

C. A Discovery Stay Would Not Prejudice Plaintiffs

In contrast to the significant burden and expense that premature discovery would impose

⁴ Even if the Court permits Plaintiffs leave to amend their Complaint, staying discovery will prevent the parties and Court from expending resources until Plaintiffs file a complaint that can withstand Rule 12 challenges.

upon Defendants and nonparties, Plaintiffs will not be prejudiced at all by a stay. *See, e.g., Cochran v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.*, 137 F. App'x 768, 773 (6th Cir. 2005) (affirming the district court's stay of discovery because the plaintiff could not prove substantial prejudice). That Plaintiffs do not seek injunctive relief highlights the lack of prejudice from a stay. Additionally, discovery would be stayed only until the Court decides whether Plaintiffs have a viable claim. Briefing on the Motions will be complete by July 31, 2023. Until that ruling, the parties can make progress in the case without launching into discovery, including by negotiating a protective order and an electronically-stored information order, so that they can be prepared for discovery should Plaintiffs' claims survive in some scope as to some Defendants. The parties also do not need discovery to preserve potentially relevant evidence. The Court has reiterated the parties' preservation obligations under the Federal Rules. Defendants have taken appropriate steps to comply with their obligations, and Plaintiffs have sent preservation notices to nonparties, such as the National Apartment Association.

In short, a stay would not affect Plaintiffs' ability to prosecute their claims if the Motions to Dismiss are denied and would preserve the parties' resources if the Motions are granted.

V. CONCLUSION

A stay of discovery pending resolution of Defendants' Motions to Dismiss is warranted given that the Court's decision on the Motions likely will fundamentally alter the scope of discovery, potentially obviating or at least reducing the burden and expense on the Court, nonparties, and the parties, especially for any Defendants dismissed entirely. Defendants respectfully request that the Court grant Defendants' Motion to Stay.

DATED: July 7, 2023

Respectfully submitted,

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I hereby certify that on July 7, 2023, I electronically filed the foregoing document with the Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system, which will send notification of such filing to all attorneys of record registered on the CM/ECF system.

DATED this 7th day of July, 2023.

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